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Abstract 
Using longitudinal Chinese county-level data from 2005 to 2007, we examine the causal effect of 
the Province-Managing-County fiscal reform on primary education spending by combining 
propensity score matching with the difference-in-difference method and allowing for the 
concurrent County Strengthening and Power Expansion reform. While the fiscal reform 
significantly increases per pupil expenditure on elementary education, there is little evidence 
showing that this fiscal reform narrows the urban-rural expenditure gap within counties. This 
Province-Managing-County reform, on the other hand, aggravates regional educational spending 
disparity in elementary schools based on the observation that the reform has caused a higher 
increase of per pupil educational spending in the affluent Eastern Region than the increase in 
Central and West China.  
 
JEL Classifications: H11, H75, I22, I24 
Keywords: Province-Managing-County reform, fiscal decentralization, per pupil educational 
expenditure, causal effect. 
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1. Introduction 
 China’s unprecedented economic growth over the past few decades has been 
accompanied by an alarming increase in income inequality, which is now higher than that of the 
United States by a significant margin, and has become a major policy concern of the government 
(Knight 2014; Sicular 2015; Xie & Zhou 2014). While personal and family characteristics are the 
key determinants of income inequality in developed economies, it is widely held that regional 
disparities and the urban-rural gap play much more important roles in China, as a result of 
China’s pro-urban institutional framework (e.g. Xie & Zhou 2014). To the extent that the urban-
rural gap in human capital (in both quantity and quality) drives the urban-rural earnings gap 
(Zhang et al. 2015), it will be interesting to study the effect on primary education spending in 
counties (that are largely rural) arising from a recent fiscal decentralization reform in China 
which has eliminated the prefecture city government as the intermediate layer between the 
province and the county. 
The hierarchical structure of governance in China consists of five layers of governments - 
from the highest to the lowest: the central, province or municipality-level, prefecture or city-level 
(hereafter city-level), county-level and township-level (Wang et al., 2012; Tsang, 1996). Between 
the 1980s and the early 2000s, this hierarchical system featured a highly centralized fiscal 
managing system. Governments at the city level undertook a strict control of fiscal revenues and 
expenditures of the lower county-level governments, which in effect were the primary providers 
of public education for residents in their jurisdictions. The risk of this institutional arrangement 
is that city governments are inclined to withhold revenue sources allocated to counties and at the 
same time shift expense responsibilities to counties due to the priority of urban construction and 
development that had been pursued by most city-level governments in China (Wang et al., 2012). 
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One of the consequences is that many county governments suffer from chronic underfunding of 
basic public services.  
The central government, therefore, enacted a fiscal reform known as the Province-
Managing-County (PMC) reform in 2004, aiming to lessen the fiscal stress of county 
governments. In contrast to the old system where county governments were strictly under the 
control of city governments, this reform enabled county governments to directly receive funding 
from the provincial government and report to the provincial government about expenditures. 
Specifically, the three stated goals of this reform are to (a) improve local economic development, 
(b) augment local finance capacity, and (c) equalize the supply of public services across counties. 
As the middle layer – city governments between local and provincial governments, is less likely 
than before to withhold sources allocated to counties and to shift expenditure responsibilities to 
county governments, the PMC is expected to promote fiscal decentralization in China (Wang et 
al., 2012). 
The impact of the PMC reform on the public service delivery and regional disparity has 
been inconclusive in the existing studies. The proponents of the reform contend that by 
simplifying government administration and standardizing intergovernmental financial 
relationship the reform will increase the supply of public services by city and county 
governments (Wang & Li, 2008). The PMC reform is also found to have a positive effect on 
reducing the disparity of educational expenditure between urban and rural areas (Zong & Ding, 
2013).  The critics of the PMC reform, nevertheless, insist that the PMC reform will decrease 
local spending on education and public health as more resources could be redirected to 
productive expenditure at the expense of welfare expenditure (Liu et al., 2012).   
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The reasons for the inconclusive results in the existing literature might be two-fold. On 
the one hand, existing research based on data from one or a couple of provinces lack national 
representativeness. In fact, the PMC reform was implemented in 24 provinces or equivalent 
administrative divisions. In addition, participating provinces may have responded differently in 
designing measures and institutional arrangements to redistribute responsibilities between city 
and county governments within the province. It is very likely that estimates may depend on the 
specific provinces used in the study. On the other hand, previous conventional panel data and 
generalized method of moment analyses do not adequately account for selection bias of the PMC 
reform, which is very likely to result in biased estimates of the impact of PMC reform on 
educational expenditure (Cai & Huang, 2010; Liu et al., 2012). In the framework of a quasi-
experiment design, this article addresses both of these two methodological challenges to examine 
the impact of PMC reform on per pupil educational expenditure and its impact on the spending 
disparity between urban and rural areas. Since the Western, Central and Eastern Regions of 
China are quite different in socio-economic development, the effect of the PMC reform on per 
pupil educational expenditure gap across regions is also explored.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the PMC 
reform. Section 3 reviews the consequences of fiscal decentralization practice across countries 
and sets up the research propositions to be tested in the empirical analysis. Data and empirical 
framework are described in Section 4. We present our results in Section 5 and the concluding 
remarks in the final section.  
 
2. Background of the PMC Reform 
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China has witnessed an institutional reform in the 1980s which placed county 
governments under the exclusive control of city governments. This institutional arrangement, in 
the transition time, broke the long-standing segregated development between cities and counties. 
For a long time, the cities had the chance to focus exclusively on the industrial development at 
the expense of the counties. At that time, this system change had greatly improved the efficiency 
of resources sharing across different administrative divisions as rural areas could not only 
provide food for the city population but also lease land needed for the urban expansion (Zhang, 
2011). With the rapid growth of the Chinese economy, this City-Managing-County (CMC) 
system with too many layers and therefore with soaring costs has become increasingly 
incompatible with a more market-oriented economy. Liu and Alm (2016) highlight the 
administrative inefficiency and the widening gap between revenue and expenditure assignments 
at the county level. The CMC model also caused the over-industrialization of urban area and the 
underdevelopment and stagnant socio-economic growth of rural districts, which further 
reinforced the inequitable distribution of public services across counties.  
Faced with all these challenges, the Chinese Central Government started the PMC reform 
in which the provincial government would directly manage counties, bypassing the layer of 
cities. The phases and key features of the PMC reform are summarized in Table 1. The most 
important change of the PMC reform in public finance is to allow the provincial government to 
simultaneously control city and county governments in fiscal revenue and public spending. The 
county governments now directly report to the provincial government with regard to public 
affairs including, but not limited to, the sharing of revenues and expenditures between local and 
central government, inter-governmental transfer, government budgets and final accounts. As 
such, the PMC reform is also referred to as “PMC flattening reform” (Li, Lu & Wang, 2016). 
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The reform was first piloted in counties of provinces located in the middle and north part of 
China such as Anhui, Henan, Hubei, Liaoning and Jilin as listed in Table 1. In 2006, the program 
was expanded to Jiangsu, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Gansu, and Qinghai in Eastern and Western China. 
Although the Department of Finance, in July 2009, released the Opinions on Enhancing the 
Province-Managing-County Reform, proposing to implement this reform across all provinces 
except the minority autonomous regions by 2012, it seems that the PMC reform was slowed 
down and even at a standstill. By the end of 2012, 1099 counties from 24 provinces, representing 
approximately 56 percent of all counties across the country, had implemented the PMC reform 
(Liu, 2013).  
By sorting out the inter-governmental financial relationship, the PMC reform is expected 
to accelerate local economic growth, to improve the financial capability of local governments, 
and to close the gap in basic public services between urban and rural areas. However, the extent 
to which the PMC reform has achieved any of these policy goals remains an open question. 
The County Strengthening and Power Expansion (Power Expansion hereafter) is a 
simultaneous policy change that took place roughly at the same time as the PMC reform. 
Alongside the PMC reform which is concerned with fiscal decentralization, some provinces are 
also engaged in the Power Expansion for counties in aspects like local economic development 
and social management, in order to improve local economic performance through a flattened 
government structure (Li, Lu & Wang, 2016). One of the many noteworthy cases is Zhejiang 
Province, where the provincial government empowers the county authorities in the examination 
and approval of a variety of municipal and economic affairs. These affairs include, but are not 
limited to, the construction of infrastructure, foreign investment projects and the autonomy in the 
government personnel management (Li et al., 2016; Wu, 2013). This power expansion reform 
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originated in Zhejiang is then gradually replicated by many other provinces for its success in 
motivating local governments. Since the Power Expansion reform is a policy change that 
provides certain discretion for local governments, it may have an effect on local spending in 
public education, independent of the PMC reform. In order to account for any confounding effect 
of the Power Expansion reform, we control for a dummy indicating the Power Expansion reform 
status for each county in the analysis. 
 
3. Literature Review on Fiscal Decentralization and Research Propositions 
As with studies of the PMC decentralization reform on public finance in China, the 
international evidence of fiscal decentralization reforms on social welfare is also inconclusive. 
While some states in America adopt a centralized school funding system to address the spending 
disparities across school districts, an increasing number of countries are devolving the 
administrative, fiscal and political functions of the central government to local governments 
(Ahlin & Mork, 2008; Brunner & Sonstelie, 2006).  According to the theory of fiscal federalism 
(Oates, 1972, 2008), the decentralized delivery of public services at lower level of governments 
will improve social welfare if “there is no cost advantage associated with the centralized 
provision” (Oates, 2008, p.314). In line with this theory, local educational agencies would expect 
better educational outputs with a decentralized school finance system where local control could 
be achieved by empowering community members, school board, teachers, parents and students 
in the decision-making process (Grosskopf & Moutray, 2001). Recent evidence of the centralized 
school finance and administrative experiment in California implies that the centralized system is 
associated with the declines in school resources and student achievement relative to other states 
(Brunner & Sonstelie, 2006).  
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The fiscal decentralization in education system certainly is not a panacea for all the 
contemporary issues that have been widely discussed in the field of education including cost 
savings, regional disparity and public service for the poor. Rather, the scholarly literature is 
mixed in the finding. Levin (1985) argues that when there are conflicts between local priorities 
and national concerns, simply replacing categorical grants with block grants would cause a waste 
of federal resources. The effect of decentralization on cost saving also varies by different types of 
educational cost. By comparing the education spending control under the province, local school 
board with overlapping jurisdictions, and local school board without overlapping jurisdictions, 
Canadian empirical experience suggests that the most decentralized regime - local school board 
control without overlapping jurisdictions, is associated with the lowest overall education cost 
while the provincial control of education spending is very limited in controlling for other 
education costs except for teacher costs (Landon, 1999). Similar cost saving effect of 
decentralization is also found in primary schools in the Philippines (Azfar et al., 1999). 
Surprisingly, another inference of Landon’s study that the provincial control of education 
spending could be best at equalizing per pupil spending across districts is at odds with evidence 
from some other developing countries, such as China and Chile. Studies from both countries 
show that decentralization is detrimental to the equity of education spending across districts 
(West & Wong, 1995; Winkler & Rounds, 1996). With respect to the effect of fiscal 
decentralization on the supply of public services, fiscal decentralization in China is shown to 
deteriorate the accessibility to public services for the poor (Braunn & Crote, 2000). Yet in 
general, the authors indicate that the effect of decentralization on the public service delivery for 
the poor also depends on the capacity of local governments in management and the local power 
of the poor.  
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We construct our empirical analysis by testing the following three research propositions. 
In the old CMC model, city government was dominant in receiving financial resources and 
county government only shared a small slice of the pie in the hierarchical system. With the new 
reform which enables provincial government to directly fund county governments, county 
governments are on parity with city governments in the hierarchical structure in assorted public 
affairs such as the sharing of revenue and expenditure, intergovernmental transfer, public finance 
flow, government budgeting and final accounts and annual account closing. The PMC reform 
thus minimizes the risk of public funding granted to local governments being withheld by city 
governments in the CMC model and therefore is expected to augment local finance capacity. 
Several previous studies have confirmed that the PMC reform is effective in increasing local 
finance capacity and mitigating local finance difficulties (Liu et al., 2012; Mao & Zhao, 2012). 
With more financial resources available, county governments are expected to spend more on 
compulsory education. So we come up with our first proposition that the PMC reform could 
positively influence the per pupil educational spending at the county level.  
City governments in the mode of CMC used to focus on the development of economy in 
its urban area and spent larger amounts of public funding on the urbanization than the 
development of rural area. The over-allocation of resources to the urban and underfunding to the 
rural areas contributed to the deterioration of the rural-urban gap in the supply of public services 
(Tao, 2012). As the PMC reform designates the county government as the primary provider for 
the infrastructure and public services in the jurisdiction, the consequent increase in financial 
capacity and decision-making power through the PMC reform offers local governments a viable 
pathway to improve the quantity and also the quality of public services. On the positive side, 
since public funding can now be directly granted to county governments, it is very likely that the 
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provincial governments involved in the PMC reform will attempt to coordinate the urban-rural 
socio-economic development by raising the appropriate rate of public transfer funding to local 
governments, which would then facilitate the equalization of public services within the province 
and coordinate rural and urban development (Jia & Yu, 2010). As allured by earlier studies, the 
PMC reform, which is deemed as a decentralization reform in China and may result in extra 
spending in infrastructure, could be detrimental to, or at best have no effect on educational 
spending disparities between urban and rural area on the negative side (e.g. Liu et.al., 2012; West 
& Wong, 1995). The second proposition of this paper, therefore, is that the PMC reform would 
have a non-positive effect on the rural-urban gap in elementary school spending within each 
county.  
The Eastern, Central and Western regions of China are distinctive in local finance 
capacity and spending preference, which is believed to be associated with the regional spending 
disparity in compulsory education. Local governments with different spending preference will 
presumably have different responses to the improved local capacity after PMC reform. Being the 
most affluent region, Eastern China is not only more capable of guaranteeing adequate funding 
for local education but also has strong preference in securing investment in education. With even 
more public resources available under the PMC reform, counties in Eastern China are expected 
to be more likely to invest in compulsory education and social welfare system. On the contrary, 
less developed Central and Western China would rather spend the extra funding to accelerate the 
growth of local economies than improve local public services and infrastructure. The impact of 
the PMC reform on spending on public education, therefore, is varying greatly across regions 
(Liu, 2012; Luo & Yang, 2013; Mao & Zhao, 2012;) Based on this perception, we posited our 
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third hypothesis that the PMC reform will aggravate the regional difference in per pupil 
educational expenditure. 
    
4. Data and Empirical Framework 
4.1 Data Description  
To examine the effect of the PMC reform, we construct a county-level longitudinal data 
set from 2005 and 2007 by merging China County Statistical Yearbook and Digest of County 
Finance Statistics in China. The combined data set contains extensive information on socio-
economic background and finance statistics of all counties across the country.  
For the purpose of maintaining the consistency between the two merged data sets, we 
cleaned our data according to the following steps: (1) City districts, one of the main components 
of county-level administrative units, were excluded from the analysis as the PMC reform only 
involved standalone counties and county-level cities; (2) We eliminated the four municipalities – 
Beijing, Shanghai, Chongqing and Tianjin, as they were not the targets of PMC reform. Hainan 
province was originally established with the system of province directly managing counties, and 
therefore was removed from the sample. Since the PMC reform had been implemented in 
Zhejiang in the 1990s, we also dropped all counties from Zhejiang Province; (3) Xinjiang and 
Tibet were not included because of massive missing data; (4) Counties involved in any change in 
either names or administrative affiliations between the year of 2005 and 2007 were deleted; (5) 
Monetary units in the data set were adjusted using 2005 constant prices. After all these steps, we 
end up with a balanced panel of 1,526 counties and county-level cities.1  
                                                     
1 It is worth mentioning that our sample is disproportionately rural as it excludes the 300 or so major cities 
(municipalities or prefecture-level cities) which manage all county-level city districts from the outset.  
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
 11 
Based on the process of PMC and data structure, we divide the reform into three phases: 
(1) In 2004-2005, only 191 counties (12.5%) were involved in the pilot reform; (2) In 2006-2007 
of expansion, 265 more counties (17.4%) joined in the PMC reform; and (3) Ever since 2008, 
data is inaccessible even though the reform is still in effect. The subsequent evaluation of PMC 
reform further deleted the 191 counties participated the pilot program since we have no access to 
their pre-reform information.  
Moreover, we have to drop any counties with missing values on the key variables in 
either 2005 or 2007. The final sample includes 1,296 counties which have both pre-and after-
reform information available. Of these, 255, or 19.7%, were exposed to the PMC reform during 
our sample period. 
  
4.2 Empirical Framework  
4.2.1 Data unbalance and propensity score matching.  
As the PMC reform was started as a pilot program and then expanded to more counties, it 
was granted advantages and disadvantages at the same time in terms of evaluating the causal 
effect in the analysis. On the positive side, one could always observe participating (treatment) 
and non-participating (control) counties at a certain time point when the reform is happening. 
That treatment and control groups are in the same data set with detailed information made it 
possible for researchers to observe the change of these two groups before and after PMC reform. 
On the negative side, the selection of counties in the process of PMC reform is not at random, 
which violates the non-ignorable treatment assignment assumption when making causal 
inference. As stated in the documentation, “qualified districts can experiment the PMC reform 
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according to local conditions”2. The “qualified” means that counties involved in the reform and 
those not involved are differentiated in some certain traits. For instance, the initial stage of the 
PMC reform was manifested as “strong counties extending power”, which means that strong 
counties with well-developed local economies and adequate public finance usually were the 
pioneers of the reform, thus implying systemic differences between reformed and un-reformed 
counties in key characteristics such as economic development, public finance, population and 
geographic location. In other words, the non-random (self-) selection of counties into the 
program introduces selection bias to the evaluation if not addressed. When the treatment and 
control groups are unbalanced because of non-randomly selection process, the PMC reform is no 
longer an exogenous but endogenous variable determined by other factors. Simply adding the 
reform to regression models will produce a biased estimate.  
To handle this methodological challenge, this article uses propensity score matching to 
control for the systematic differences between the treated and untreated to achieve data balance. 
First of all, we employ pre-reform data in the year of 2005 to check data unbalance through 
identifying characteristics that the treated and untreated are systematically different in. These 
characteristics identified in the previous step will be included as independent variables to predict 
the probability of being a reformed county, i.e. in the treatment group, between 2005 and 2007. A 
propensity score, which has been considered as the prerequisite of a balanced data set, will be 
predicted from the regression. We use the traditional logistic regression to predict propensity 
score (Murnane & Willett, 2011).3 The next step is to match the treated and untreated units, in 
                                                     
2 Speech by Wen Jiabao (China’s former Prime Minister) in the national conference on the pilot work of rural 
taxation and fee reform on June 6-7, 2006.  
3 We alternatively used the generalized boosted modeling (McCaffrey et al. 2004), a multivariate nonparametric data 
adaptive modelling algorithm, to predict propensity scores. The results are fully consistent with our main findings. 
These results are available from the corresponding author, upon request.  
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this case, the reformed and unreformed counties, based on the predicted propensity scores. The 
logic of matching is to find an untreated unit in the control group as a counterfactual outcome to 
pair with the treated unit4. In this paper we choose two of the most popular methods: the 
Mahalanobis distance, and nearest neighbor within caliper matching (Dehejia & Wahba, 2002; 
Guo & Fraser, 2010). In the final step, the group of treated is matched with their counterfactual 
pairs found in the control group to form a new and balanced data to analyze the causal effect of 
the PMC. 
By presenting results derived from two alternative matching strategies, we explicitly 
allow for a tradeoff between maximizing the common support as in Mahalanobis distance 
matching and maximizing the matched sample size as in the nearest neighbor matching 
(Murnane & Willett, 2011).   
   
4.2.2 Combining propensity score matching with Difference-in-difference (PSM-DID) 
Even though propensity score matching could balance the data based upon observed 
characteristics, there might be differences between the treated and untreated in many 
unobservable factors such as local institutional arrangement in administration and public finance, 
historical value and culture, and the negotiation power of local governors with supervising 
authorities. If these unobservable variables are correlated with the PMC reform, omitting them 
would also cause the problem of endogeneity and a biased estimate of the treatment effect (Chen 
et al., 2013; Khandker et al., 2010). To address this problem, we use our two-year matched data 
to estimate a difference-in-difference (DID) regression to account for these time-invariant 
                                                     
4 The counterfactual outcome is the outcome of the treated had it been in the control group, which is unobservable in 
the data.  
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unobservable characteristics. The combination of propensity score matching with DID will be 
referred to as the PSM-DID estimator hereafter.5  
Using the matched panel of counties, we estimate the following DID model:  
𝐸𝑥𝑝 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑀𝐶 + 𝛽2𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 ̵𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑀𝐶 ∙ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 ̵𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚 + 𝛾𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛 + 𝛿𝑋 + 𝜇       (1) 
where the dependent variable Exp is the per pupil education spending for each county in either 
2005 or 2007. PMC indicates that the PMC reform has been implemented in the county by 2007 
and captures the possible differences between the treatment and control groups prior to the 
reform time. The post-reform dummy indicates post-reform years and X represents a set of 
control variables. The coefficient of interest is 𝛽3, which is the coefficient on the dummy 
variable equal to one for those counties participating in the PMC reform in 2007 and is the PSM-
DID estimator. We also include the Power Expansion reform dummy Expan in the model to 
indicate if the county has experienced any empowerment in the self-management of local 
economy, social affairs and personnel. Although DID regression has accounted for unobservable 
factors across counties, it does not rule out the time-varying unobservable variables that could 
potentially bias the estimates. However, we believe that the bias in our analysis is lessened 
because of the two-year duration, a very short time to expect dramatic changes of the time-
varying variables.  As part of the process of estimating an unbiased effect, we also explore a set 
of time-varying variables such as assorted intergovernmental transfer in the DID regression.  
Table 2 compares the means of the outcome variables between the treated and the control 
group, and before and after the PMC reform. It turns out that counties participating in the PMC 
already spend 311 CHY (US $48) more on per pupil elementary schooling than non-participating 
counties, even before the reform was implemented. More importantly, this difference almost 
                                                     
5 It is also known as the MDID estimator in the literature (e.g., Blundell & Costa Dias, 2009; Heckman et al. 1997). 
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doubled, to 594 CHY (US $91). This pattern still holds when we look at elementary school 
spending in urban and rural areas separately. The systematic difference across the groups 
highlights the importance of accounting for selectivity bias due to non-random self-sorting into 
the reform.  
Considering that the PMC effect may be confounded by other variables, we control for 
three other sets of variables in our DID regressions, apart from regional dummies:6 
(1) Factors relating to inter-governmental transfers. As the central government started a 
new mechanism to secure the funding for rural compulsory education in 2006, more transfer 
funding from central and provincial governments had been granted to support local compulsory 
education in fields of teacher salary, general public funding, tuition waiver, free books, 
construction of school buildings, nutrition plans, online learning and so forth. In order to 
eliminate the confoundedness of this new mechanism, we control for per pupil financial subsidy 
to rural compulsory education. Given that local governments may be less motivated in allocating 
public funding to education after receiving fiscal transfers from central and province 
governments, we also include the local fiscal effort in education defined as the total educational 
expenditure divided by total expenditure in the model.  
(2) Factors relating to the demand of compulsory education. This is approximated by per 
household pupil enrollment and elementary enrollment in absolute numbers. 
(3) Factors relating to education costs. This includes elementary enrollment and 
population density.  
Table 2 also compares the means of these control variables between the treated and the 
control group, and before and after the PMC reform. Participating counties have fewer children 
                                                     
6 These will be used as control variables both in a naïve DID model using the full sample of counties (i.e. without 
accounting for self-selection into the PMC reform), or in the DID stage of the PSM-DID analysis. 
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per household and also lower population density than non-participating counties, although these 
gaps do not change significantly over our two-year sample period as might be expected. On the 
other hand, there is no significant difference in per pupil subsidy to rural education, fiscal effort 
or elementary enrolment across the treatment status. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Data Balance and Propensity Scores 
In the estimation of the propensity score for each county, the dependent variable is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the county is under reform and zero otherwise. Our choice of the 
matching variables is inspired by economic theory and previous empirical studies: importantly 
these variables must be measured before treatment taking place so that they are not confounded 
with outcomes or anticipation of treatment. We have considered three sets of matching variables 
as shown: (1) local economy indicators indicated by log per capita GDP, local finance capacity 
measured by per capita fiscal revenue, and per capita general intergovernmental transfer; (2) 
local demographic and labor market indicators including the shares of rural population and labor 
force in the Primary Sector, and (3) geographical indicators represented by regional dummy 
variables.  
Table 3 presents the means of these matching variables in 2005 by the treatment status in 
2007 in Columns 1 and 2. All the standardized mean differences in Column 3 are statistically 
significant at the 5% level, indicating that the sample is highly unbalanced in terms of observable 
characteristics before we apply matching. Counties which implemented the PMC reform between 
2005 and 2007 are significantly wealthier than those who remain untreated by the end of the 
sample period in terms of per capita GDP, fiscal revenue and general transfer. This echoes the 
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perception that wealthier counties are more likely to participate in the reform relative to poorer 
ones.  Moreover, PMC reform participation is correlated with smaller rural population and lower 
share of labor force in the Primary Sector. Participating counties are also more likely to be from 
the Central Region compared to the Eastern and Western Regions. Column 4 shows the variance 
ratio for continuous variables, with all but the log per capita GDP outside the conventional 
acceptable range for data balance. 
Table A1 in the Appendix presents the logistic regression estimates, which are used by 
both matching strategies.7 Compared to counties from Western China, counties in the Central 
part are more likely to participate in the PMC reform, as allured in Table 1 that the PMC reform 
was firstly piloted in the middle part and that even almost all counties in Anhui and Hubei 
provinces were PMC participants without the pilot phase. Counties with higher per capita GDP 
are of higher likelihood to respond to PMC reform and this effect is not different across regions. 
Interestingly, a higher local fiscal revenue is associated with a lower probability of being a PMC 
reform participant for counties in Western China, indicating that counties in the West with more 
finance resources are less likely to participate in the PMC reform. It makes sense given that the 
self-insufficient counties may expect a favorable change by carrying out the PMC reform. 
Following the same logic, counties in Western China with higher proportion of rural population 
and labor force in the Primary Sector are more likely to take part in PMC reform to stimulate 
local economies. The association between the proportion of rural population and PMC reform 
                                                     
7 Our choice of variables is systematically guided by the LR test with the help of the Stata command psestimate based 
on Imbens and Rubin (2015). The proportion of fiscal dependents and per capita special transfer in the original analysis 
were excluded. The final first order variables in the matching model are log per capita GDP, log per capita fiscal 
revenue, log general transfers, the proportion of rural enrolment, the percentage of labor force in the Primary Sector, 
and region dummies. We also include interaction of these variables and the second order of log per capita GDP and 
the proportion of rural population within each county.  
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choice in Eastern and Central China is weaker than that in the West. Lastly, counties across all 
three regions that receive more per capita general transfer are predicted to have a higher 
probability to take part in the PMC reform. This probability is even larger for counties in Eastern 
and Central China.   
Table 4 reports the data balancing tests of the post-matching samples. The treated and 
untreated counties are matched based on the estimated propensity scores via Malahanobis 
distance and nearest neighbor within caliper matching, using logistic regression. After matching, 
the sample size is reduced from 1,296 to 262 and 510, respectively. Counties from the treatment 
group and their counterparts from the control group are not significantly different at even the 
10% level for the Malahanobis distance matching while four of variables are still unbalanced for 
the nearest neighbor within caliper matching due to the preservation of all counties in the 
treatment group.  
Figure 1 shows the densities of the estimated propensity score by the treatment status, 
before and after applying matching under the two alternative strategies. While the non-treated 
group was heavily skewed towards zero before matching, there is reasonably good common 
support throughout the propensity score distribution for both matching methods after matching. 
Figure A1 in the Appendix visualizes how much of the treatment and the control are on the 
common support by the estimated propensity scores. For the Malahanobis distance matching, the 
fit is almost perfect. However, this is achieved at the expense of losing almost half of the sample.  
5.2 PMC Impacts on Per-Pupil Educational Expenditure   
In this section, we compare the effects of PMC reform on county-level per pupil 
expenditure, reported in Table 5, estimated from OLS, DID, and 4 variants of PSM-DID. With 
control variables including region and time dummies in the OLS regression, the PMC reform 
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increases county-level per pupil educational expenditure by 296 CHY (approximately US $46). 
This coefficient, however, is biased because the OLS regression fails to account for the impacts 
of unobservable factors. The second column of the DID regression, which has accounted the 
time-invariant unobservable variables, reports a slightly higher coefficient of 320 CHY 
(approximately US $49) than the previous OLS estimate with an increase of 8.2%.  
While the PSM-DID method could not account for time-varying unobservable variables, 
estimates are less biased than OLS and simple DID estimates. The significant and positive 
coefficients of reform variable indicate that counties which are exposed to the PMC reform, on 
average, are spending more on educating pupils in elementary schools.  
For both PSM-DID strategies, we first report a baseline estimate which only controls for 
the Power Expansion reform and region dummies. So the difference between this parsimonious 
specification and the full specification with all the controls reveals the effect of the full set of 
additional control variables as a whole. The differences in point estimates of PMC reform 
between the two matching strategies indicate the sensitivity of results to different scenarios. 
However, they are all substantially lower than the naïve DID estimates. This highlights the 
importance of allowing for self-sorting when the treatment status is not randomly assigned. With 
respect to the two matching strategies, the first one - matching by logistic regression and 
Mahalanobis distance has a coefficient of 202 CHY (approximately US $31) when full controls 
are included, with the Power Expansion reform having a positive but insignificant effect. The 
corresponding full specification of matching by logistic regression with the nearest neighbor 
within caliper yields an estimate of 238 CHY (or US $37), with the Power Expansion coefficient 
being positive but insignificant. Given that the mean educational spending for each elementary 
pupil increases from 1,546 (US $238) to 2,633 CHY (US $405) among the treated between 2005 
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and 2007, roughly one fifth of this growth can be attributed to the PMC reform. Moreover, both 
strategies yield estimates which are statistically significant at the 1%. Among the control 
variables, we find that fiscal effort has a positive effect while elementary enrolment and the share 
of fiscal dependents all have a negative effect. It is worth noting that per pupil financial subsidy 
appears to have a negative effect suggesting possible crowding out effect although the effect is 
sensitive to the choice of the matching strategy. 
Hence our first proposition of a positive impact of PMC reform on the local educational 
spending is confirmed. 
5.3 PMC Effect on Urban-Rural Spending Disparity  
 In order to examine the impact of PMC reform on the spending disparity between rural 
and urban area within counties, we employ the difference of per pupil educational spending 
between rural and urban areas as dependent variable in the DID regression. If coefficients of 
PMC reform are negative, one can infer that the PMC reform helps to narrow down the urban-
rural educational spending gap. Theoretically, all control variables in this disparity model should 
also be defined as the differences between urban and rural area, but we only apply this rule to 
elementary enrollment and per household pupils given that we do not have within-county 
variation for other variables.  
 As shown in Table 6, the coefficients of PMC reform are insignificant with both matching 
strategies, and regardless of the controls for DID or for the reference Western Region. Moreover, 
the coefficients of the interaction term between PMC and regions are also all insignificant, 
indicating that the PMC effect does not appear to have differential effect across regions on the 
urban-rural gap. However, it is noticeable that the large negative coefficients on the Eastern 
Region dummy suggest that the more affluent Eastern Region counties have a lower urban-rural 
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disparity in per pupil educational spending before the reform, possibly reflecting different 
preferences regarding provision of public services by local governments across regions.   
These results are perhaps not surprising. From a policy perspective, it is even an expected 
outcome since the guidelines of the PMC reform do not specifically address the goal of 
eliminating district disparity, let alone provide detailed instructions for local governments to 
reduce the disparity. This finding, therefore, answers our second inquiry that the PMC reform has 
little effect on closing the urban-rural gap in educational spending in elementary schools. 
Interestingly, results across all models show that the Power Expansion reform turns out to be 
negative and significant at the 5% level under both matching strategies, suggesting that the 
concurrent Expansion reform could be more effective than the PMC reform as far as the urban-
rural spending disparity is concerned. 
5.4 PMC Impact on Regional Spending Disparity  
We estimate a pooled specification allowing the PMC reform indicator to interact with 
the Eastern and Central regional dummies in this section. As suggested by Table 7, the PMC 
reform has a positive and statistically significant effect for the Western Region, which is chosen 
as the reference category. Despite a substantial lead over Western Region before the reform, the 
PMC reform yields an additional increase of 351 to 362 CHY ($54-56) on educational spending 
in the Eastern Region, depending on the matching strategy. The Central Region, on the other 
hand, is no different from the Western Region, in either pre-reform spending or the impact of the 
PMC reform.  Moreover, there is some weak evidence of a positive effect of the Power 
Expansion reform on per pupil elementary school spending after controlling for region and 
treatment dummy in the model, which is only statistically significant at the 10% level under 
Mahalanobis distance matching. Therefore, notwithstanding an overall significant impact of the 
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PMC reform on per pupil educational spending, this effect is mainly attributable to that in 
Eastern China, the region with better developed local economy and more affluent counties. This 
further justifies our third hypothesis of a growing regional inequality between regions in per 
pupil educational expenditure. Given the existing investment inequality in elementary schools 
among Eastern, Central and Western China,8 our inference is that the province-managing-county 
reform is making the situation even worse.   
 This growing spending inequality across regions may result from the fact that local 
governments have quite different spending preferences. Although the primary goal of PMC 
reform is to “facilitate the transformation of local governments, provide better public services 
and promote sustainability of socio-economic development”,9 local governments in Western and 
Central China with more poor counties and higher pressure of improving economies are more 
likely to give priority to economic development than to compulsory education, public health and 
social security. By contrast, Eastern China with more wealthy counties and a higher level of 
socio-economic development, and thereby a lower demand for investment in local economics, 
prefers to allocate more resources to improve social welfare system. Indeed, local governments 
in several provinces like Zhejiang and Jiangsu, the two most affluent provinces in the Eastern 
Region, are competing against each other in allocating resources to public services (Huang, 
2012). Considering that the local governments have already been very different in spending 
capacity and structure, the PMC reform of decentralization may simply amplify the differences 
and widen the regional expenditure inequality, which then echoes our third hypothesis.  
                                                     
8 The average per pupil expenditure of Eastern, Central and Western China is 1341, 1237 and 1264 Yuan in 2005, 
respectively. 
9 Department of Finance of China (2009). The opinions on advancing the Province-Managing-County fiscal reform, 
No. 78.  
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 While general intergovernmental transfers appear to have a positive but weak effect on 
elementary education, the effect of special transfers which bears on special demands or 
conditions on spending is much stronger.  On the other hand, the effect of financial subsidy to 
rural education on elementary education spending is strongly negative and statistically 
significant under one matching strategy, suggesting it could be crowding out other educational 
resources. 
5.5. Robustness with respect to extending the sample period  
Our sample period of two years is indeed relatively short. This might bias our estimates 
downward (toward zero) if the full impact of the PMC reform may take longer time to be 
reflected. We have managed to get two more years of data on education expenditure by counties, 
for the year 2003 and 2009, respectively. Figure 2 shows the trend in mean educational 
expenditure by treatment status for the three regions separately, and for the country as a whole. It 
is apparent that the year 2005 marks a turning point, after which the growth in educational 
expenditure accelerates and continues well into 2009. A second observation is that the PMC 
participants in the Eastern Region have experienced by far the strongest growth, hence likely to 
have driven the PMC effect for the whole sample. 
Figure 3 repeats the corresponding trend in rural-urban educational spending disparity by 
treatment status for the three regions separately, and for the overall country. Even though the two 
-year estimates of PMC reform on urban-rural disparity is statistically insignificant with both 
matching strategies, this disparity is smaller in 2009 when rural counties spend more in elementary 
education. Unlike Figure 2 where counties in Eastern regions may have driven the PMC effect on 
per pupil educational spending, the overall change in the urban-rural gap in educational spending 
may be attributable to the change happened in Central China.  
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
 24 
However, we are unable to get the corresponding public finance variables which are needed 
for the matching exercise. This implies that we cannot undertake PSM-DID analysis using the 
extended sample. However, we are able to use the additional data to check the robustness of the 
DID estimates of our main sample, albeit using only basic controls including regional dummies.  
The first two columns of Table 8 present the OLS and DID estimates using the 4-period 
extended sample. Columns 3 and 4 show the corresponding estimates using the two-period sample, 
which are comparable to Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5, apart from omitting all control variables 
except for regional dummies. It is reassuring that our main conclusion of a positive and significant 
PMC effect on per pupil elementary educational spending still hold, and if anything, become more 
pronounced when we use the extended sample. The evidence also suggests that our findings are 
not driven by other reforms that take place around the same time as the PMC. Interestingly, the 
effect of the Power Expansion reform now shows a positive and statistically significant effect on 
per pupil expenditure using the extended sample. 
 
6. Conclusions and Discussion 
This article explores the impact of the Province-Managing-County decentralizing fiscal 
reform on elementary educational spending using longitudinal county-level data from 2005 to 
2007 in China. To address selection bias caused by unobservable factors, we use propensity score 
matching combined with difference-in-difference method to estimate the causal effect of the 
PMC reform on per pupil educational spending, as well as within-county spending disparities 
between rural and urban areas and disparities across regions. We also control for the concurrent 
County Strengthening and Power Expansion reform to account for any confounding effects on 
our estimates. Results show that the PMC reform significantly increases the amount of per pupil 
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spending on education but aggravates the spending inequality across regions on the one hand, 
and that the evidence on the urban-rural spending disparity is inconclusive on the other. 
 Although the PMC reform was first initiated in several counties in the 1990s and then 
formally piloted in 2004, little consensus has been reached about its effectiveness ever since. We 
also notice that there has been little guidance about its future implementation since 2012. It is 
possible that provinces might be less passionate about the PMC reform on ground of the lack of 
concrete plan and relevant supportive programs from Chinese Central Government, which seems 
to be silent on whether to continue with the reform. While previous studies have shown a 
positive effect on local financial capacity and the growth of local economies, we contribute to the 
literature by showing that the PMC reform is effective in increasing local investment in 
elementary education. In this sense, we argue that it is still worthwhile to continue with the 
implementation of PMC reform.  
Despite different policy practices of the PMC reform across provinces, actions taken by 
most provinces and local governments involved in the reform have been mostly focused on the 
approval, allocation, management and scrutiny of government spending. The PMC reform on its 
own, however, is very limited in playing a substantial role in influencing the local tax system, the 
share of expenditure and revenue of hierarchical governments as well as in the administrative 
and personnel management. The fact that local governments now directly report to the upper 
provincial government in public finance but fail to share the same status as city governments in 
administration and personnel management might prevent the PMC reform from achieving its full 
potential. From this point of view, the central government may consider a broader and deeper 
PMC reform with government administration involved. It is worth considering combining this 
reform with other types of institutional reforms in public finance, local tax system, personnel 
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management and the division of administrative areas. It seems that the Power Expansion reform 
is particularly helpful in closing the urban-rural gap in educational spending from our analysis 
and may be of merit to be incorporated with the PMC reform in this sense. Across all 
government guidelines where PMC has been mentioned, we find that information on specific 
practical instructions for local governments is very scarce. The PMC reform might have larger 
effect on public services if there is a comprehensive reform plan and mission statement about the 
strategic goals, implementation process, supplementary policy instruments and appropriate 
regulations to guide through. The insignificant effect of the PMC reform on the district disparity 
between urban and rural areas in our analysis may partially be due to the ambiguity of equity 
goal in the policy design and the lack of detailed instructions of how to address the disparity in 
the practice.     
The logit estimation of propensity score reveals that PMC reform is most likely to take 
place in strong counties with well-developed local economies whereas those poor ones would 
rather keep the old CMC model. Our first concern about the counties in the old CMC model that 
have been suffering a lot from the lack of public resources is that there might be growing 
disparities in resources across counties since PMC participants now have greater chance of 
enjoying a larger share of revenue and allocate even more resources to public services. Because 
affluent and poor counties are different in spending preferences as well - the former more 
inclined to invest in public services while the latter more driven by economic growth (Huang, 
2012) and the Western region has disproportionally poor counties while the Eastern with affluent 
counties, it is very likely that the affluent PMC participants and developing PMC participants 
will spend more on social welfare and further enlarge the already existent regional disparity. This 
seems to correspond to the Matthew Effect of the PMC reform that the strong counties get 
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stronger and the poor ones get poorer (Pan & Lv, 2013).  Despite an overall significant effect of 
the PMC reform on educational spending, this PMC effect, according to our analysis, is larger in 
the affluent Eastern Region than that in less developed Central and Western China. Considering 
the aforementioned enormous differences in local financial capacity and spending preference that 
have persisted across regions for decades, our findings imply that the central government may 
need to be very cautious about the potential adverse effects of future decentralization reforms on 
regional disparity in the provision of public services.   
 Overall, our findings suggest that the PMC reform in China which tackles the highly 
segmented and pro-urban institutional arrangement in public finance is crucial in enhancing the 
capacity of local governments in elementary education investment. However, to the extent that 
the pro-urban institutional structure still remains intact politically and administratively, the PMC 
reform in public finance will have little impact on district disparity in educational spending 
within counties and perhaps even worsen the regional disparity. Extra cautions in the future must 
be taken by governments in all tiers in extending the PMC reform when there is still an absence 
of broader institutional changes in the current hierarchical system.  
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Figures  
Figure 1a. Density of the estimated propensity score by PMC reform status, Strategy I  
 
Figure 1b. Density of the estimated propensity score by PMC reform status, Strategy II 
 
Notes. X axis is the estimated propensity score before and after matching. Data source is the sub-sample data in 
2005. PMC participants are counties that take part in the Province-Managing-County reform and non-PMC 
participants otherwise.  
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Figure 2. Educational Expenditure per pupil by Treatment across Regions 
 
Notes. Y axis is the educational spending per pupil. Data source is the extended sample (2003-2009). PMC 
participants are counties that take part in the Province-Managing-County reform and non-PMC participants 
otherwise.  
  
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
 34 
Figure 3. Urban-Rural Spending Disparity per pupil by Treatment across Regions  
 
Notes. Y axis is urban-rural educational expenditure gap per pupil. Data source is the extended sample (2003-2009). 
PMC participants are counties that take part in the Province-Managing-County reform and non-PMC participants 
otherwise.  
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Tables 
Table 1. Policy Goals, Content and Participated across Phases  
Phase Primary Targets Content Participated Provinces 
Pilot (2004-05) Intergovernmental fiscal 
relationship and local 
economic growth 
Distribution of revenue 
and expenditure among 
province-level, city-level 
and county-level 
governments, 
intergovernmental 
transfers directly from 
province to county  
Anhui a, Henan, Hubei a, 
Hebei b, Jiangxi, Liaoning 
and Jilin a 
Expansion (2006-07) Intergovernmental fiscal 
relationship, local economic 
growth and administrative 
efficiency  
Include distribution of 
revenue and expenditure 
among governments, 
intergovernmental 
transfers directly from 
province to county, the 
empowerment of tax 
management to counties, 
direct report to provincial 
governments about local 
projects  
Heilongjiang a, Shaanxi, 
Jiangsu a, Shanxi, Gansu, 
Sichuan b, and Qinghai  
Full Swing (2009-)  Intergovernmental fiscal 
relationship, local fiscal 
capacity and economic 
growth, the equalization of 
public services   
Include distribution of 
revenue and expenditure 
among governments, 
intergovernmental 
transfers directly from 
province to county, the 
local discretion in the 
approval of local projects, 
the arrangement of 
government expenditure  
Shandong, Yunnan, 
Guangxi, Ningxia b  
Notes.  
Reform administration stays with Department of Finance (DOF). 
a PMC reform operated in all counties rather than screening pilot ones first.   
b PMC reform in piloted counties started with the partial independence in the management of local economies. 
Local governments can directly report to provincial government for the examination and approval of projects. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Outcome and Control Variables in DID Model  
Variables 
Year 2005 Year 2007 
Treated Control Diff.   Treated Control Diff.  
Per pupil spending (CHY) 1,538 1,227 
 311.235*** 
(46.329) 
2,623 2,029 
593.584*** 
(66.802) 
     Urban  1,279 1,123 
155.825*** 
(52.155) 
2,069 1,648 
420.608*** 
(65.168) 
      Rural  1,634 1,254 
379.523*** 
(51.022) 
2,903 2,137 
766.922*** 
(86.648) 
Per pupil subsidy to rural 
     education (CHY) 
41.81 44.25 
-2.431 
(4.401) 
180.31 165.75 
14.563 
(14.420) 
Fiscal effort in education  0.288 0.272 
0.015 
(0.015) 
0.243 0.248 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
Per household pupils 0.276 0.333 
-0.057*** 
(0.009) 
0.244 0.308 
-0.064*** 
(0.009) 
Elementary enrolment 39,552 42,430 
-2,879 
(2419.38) 
35,667 40,807 
-5,141 
(2341.22) 
Population density 0.029 0.041 
-0.012*** 
(0.004) 
0.029 0.034 
-0.005*** 
(0.002) 
Power Expansion  0.267 0.331 
-0.065** 
(0.033) 
0.412 0.399 
0.013 
(0.034) 
Observations 255 1,041  255 1,041  
Note. Diff. = M(treated) - M(control). Standard errors of the mean difference are in the parenthesis. *p < 0.1. ** p < 
0.05. *** p < 0.01. Summary statistics for the regional dummies do not vary over time and are reported in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Pre-Matching Characteristics  
Variables 
Treated: 
Participants 
Control: 
Non-participants 
Std.  
mean diff. a 
Variance Ratio b 
Per capita     
    GDP (log) 8.864 8.702 0.176** 0.73* 
    Fiscal revenue 527.8 314.3 0.188*** 4.17* 
    General transfer 410.1 309.0 0.344*** 1.61* 
% of      
    Rural population 0.767 0.808 -0.700*** 1.88 
Labor force in 
  Primary Sector 
0.268 0.315 -0.258*** 1.61* 
Eastern 0.243 0.405 -0.352*** -- 
Central 0.510 0.272 0.502*** -- 
Western 0.247 0.323 -0.168*** -- 
Observations 255 1,041   
Note. Per capita GDP is transformed to logarithm. Pre-matching information is from data in 2005.  
a Standardized mean difference is the difference of the sample means for the treated control groups divided by the 
square root of the average of the sample variance (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1985).   
b Variance ratio is the variance of the treated group over the control (for continuous covariates). Perfect balance 
when standardized mean difference is zero and the Variance ratio is 1. Variance ratio in [0.78, 1.28] is acceptable in 
terms of data balance.  
 
Table 4. Test for Data Balance of Post-Matching Samples 
Variable 
Strategy I  Strategy II 
Mean of Counties Std. mean 
diff. 
 Mean of Counties Std. mean. 
Diff. Treated Control  Treated Control 
Per capita         
    GDP 8.740 8.739 0.001  8.864 8.902 -0.041 
    Fiscal revenue 244.39 199.92 0.039   527.8 384.12 0.127 
    General transfer 323.44 295.19 0.096  410.1 342.52 0.230** 
% of         
Rural  
  enrolment 
0.808 0.817 -0.075  0.767 0.809 -0.261** 
    Labour force in  
  Primary Sect. 
0.253 0.253 0.000  0.268 0.271 -0.014 
Eastern  0.254 0.254 0.000  0.243 0.263 -0.042 
Central 0.457 0.457 0.000  0.510 0.314 0.414** 
Western  0.289 0.289 0.000  0.247 0.424 -0.392** 
Observations 131 131   255 255  
Notes: Primary Sect.= Primary Sector. Strategy I: Logistic regression matching using Mahalanobis distance. 
Strategy II: Logistic regression matching using nearest neighbour within caliper. Per capita GDP is transformed to 
logarithm. Mean differences between the treated and the control (Mt – Mc) are tested. Pre-matching data is sub data 
sample in 2005. *p < 0.1. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.  
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Table 5. Regression Results for Education Expenditure Pre- and Post-Matching 
Variables OLS DID 
PSM-DID 
Base I Strategy I Base II Strategy II 
PMC*Post 
reform 
 
320.316*** 
(54.196) 
310.359*** 
(80.084) 
202.050*** 
(73.102) 
240.821*** 
(67.547) 
238.438*** 
(67.350) 
PMC dummy 
296.159*** 
(47.018) 
 
168.332** 
(68.873) 
156.050** 
(63.383) 
182.743 
(65.030) 
137.338 
(55.186) 
Power exp.  
16.116 
(30.476) 
10.749 
(30.740) 
124.924 
(90.452) 
78.382 
(67.320) 
135.294** 
(67.785) 
36.706 
(56.104) 
Fiscal effort  
343.463*** 
(77.195) 
351.067*** 
(74.158) 
 
563.428** 
(250.798) 
 
538.630*** 
(101.358) 
Per capita        
   Gen.   
   transfer  
0.537* 
(0.278) 
0.561* 
(0.287) 
 
0.514* 
(0.275) 
 
0.592 
(0.404) 
   Sp. transfer 
1.003*** 
(0.124) 
1.003*** 
(0.124) 
 
1.507*** 
(0.247) 
 
1.077*** 
(0.173) 
Per pupil  
   Financial         
   subsidy 
-0.285** 
(0.133) 
-0.296** 
(0.130) 
 
-1.469*** 
(0.537) 
 
-0.257* 
(0.145) 
Elementary     
   Enrolment 
-6.664*** 
(0.624) 
-6.620*** 
(0.622) 
 
-8.688*** 
(1.383) 
 
-9.216*** 
(1.032) 
Pupils(/HH) 
-1368.899*** 
(158.851) 
-1375.664*** 
(158.738) 
 
-2040.861 
(354.574) 
 
-2198.166*** 
(295.770) 
Pop. density 
-645.527 
(439.272) 
-689.232 
(445.833) 
 
-1106.47 
(780.623) 
 
-408.847 
(739.825) 
% of        
   Fiscal    
   dependents 
-8023.441*** 
(2207.757) 
-8174.419*** 
(2254.428) 
 
-9366.14** 
(4149.743) 
 
-8582.651** 
(3673.132) 
   Rural  
   enrolment 
-561.654*** 
(143.061) 
-556.251*** 
(142.590) 
 
-187.453 
(171.973) 
 
-307.196 
(267.987) 
Intercept 2106.786 2132.178 1028.358 1915.987 1042.267 2027.983 
Region  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Post reform 
dummy 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistics 189.10 184.65 110.30 58.59 168.04 102.74 
R2 0.537 0.542 0.342 0.597 0.308 0.554 
Obs. N 2,592 2,592 524 524 1,020 1,018 
Notes: Dependent variable is per pupil elementary school expenditure. Strategy I: Logistic regression matching 
using Mahalanobis distance. Strategy II: Logistic regression matching using nearest neighbour within caliper. Power 
exp. = Power Expansion Reform. Gen.= General transfer. Sp.= Special transfer. Pupils(/HH) = Pupils per 
Household. Pop. = Population.  Dependent variable is per pupil educational expenditure in elementary school in the 
county level. Cluster-robust standard errors are in the parenthesis. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
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Table 6. PSM-DID Results for Urban-Rural Spending Disparity  
Variables OLS DID 
PSM-DID 
Base I  Strategy I Base II Strategy II 
PMC*Post 
reform 
-- 
-108.031 
(89.523) 
-219.969 
(147.049) 
-235.796 
(149.611) 
0.881 
(107.48) 
-5.386 
(109.595) 
PMC dummy 
-150.470* 
(86.082) 
-97.153 
(87.584) 
1.532 
(146.750) 
-52.730 
(153.880) 
-21.500 
(105.009) 
-107.522 
(103.914) 
Power exp.  
-122.748*** 
(42.432) 
-121.033*** 
(42.478) 
-231.454** 
(113.414) 
-248.637** 
(96.736) 
-195.588** 
(83.373) 
-168.303* 
(91.131) 
Eastern 
-384.463*** 
(57.236) 
-385.615*** 
(57.269) 
-461.797*** 
(142.256) 
-468.570*** 
(146.393) 
-365.111*** 
(200.587) 
-399.805*** 
(134.818) 
Central 
-136.558** 
(54.213) 
-138.231** 
(54.218) 
-110.658 
(221.409) 
-155.371 
(145.799) 
-213.589*** 
(95.589) 
-152.418 
(94.805) 
Treated*Eastern 
-158.555 
(142.274) 
-155.990 
(142.410) 
33.942 
(211.611) 
-176.824 
(251.907) 
-149.832 
(200.587) 
-6.534 
(213.572) 
Treated*Central 
-131.225 
(128.576) 
-129.907 
(128.506) 
-540.401** 
(253.040) 
-288.416 
(232.69) 
-225.499 
(157.135) 
-7.025 
(147.100) 
Fiscal effort  
157.752 
(132.426) 
155.035 
(133.632) 
 
-260.330 
(182.340) 
 
143.872 
(180.797) 
Per capita        
   Gen. transfer  
0.055 
(0.118) 
0.046 
(0.119) 
 
0.120 
(0.329) 
 
0.107 
(0.157) 
   Sp. transfer 
-0.218 
(0.165) 
-0.217 
(0.166) 
 
0.081 
(0.582) 
 
-0.119 
(0.243) 
Per pupil  
   Financial         
   subsidy 
0.199 
(0.163) 
0.203 
(0.163) 
 
0.798 
(1.156) 
 
0.314 
(0.249)  
Urban-Rural diff. in      
   Elementary     
   enrolment 
-5.378*** 
(0.917) 
-5.363*** 
(0.920) 
 
-4.658 
(3.342) 
 
-3.026 
(3.272) 
   Pupils(/HH) 
0.025 
(0.320) 
0.001 
(0.322) 
 
42.657 
(75.948) 
 
-3.026 
(3.272) 
Pop. density 
373.757 
(485.578) 
388.125 
(486.203) 
 
4833.863*** 
(1652.021) 
 
1825.917 
(1265.245) 
% of        
   Fiscal     
   dependents 
-3371.555* 
(1641.818) 
-3317.662* 
(1643.016) 
 
-2464.628 
(5443.848) 
 
-3126.342 
(3783.954) 
   Rural           
   enrol.  
97.135 
(317.698) 
96.602 
(317.265) 
 
999.967 
(904.297) 
 
 334.203 
(707.777) 
Intercept -44.513 -53.361 60.354 -953.904 65.370 -326.218 
Post reform 
dummy 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistics 22.07 20.83 9.34 8.37 15.95 10.90 
R2 0.119 0.119 0.137 0.206 0.095 0.143 
Obs. N 2,565 2,565 524 524 1,020 1,018 
Notes: Dependent variable is the difference in per pupil educational spending between urban and rural areas within 
counties. Strategy I: Logistic regression matching using Mahalanobis distance. Strategy II: Logistic regression 
matching using nearest neighbour within caliper. Power exp. = Power Expansion Reform. Gen.= General transfer. 
Sp.= Special transfer. Pupils(/HH) = Pupils per Household. Pop. = Population. Rural enrol. =Rural enrolment. 
Cluster-robust standard errors are in the parenthesis. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.  
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Table 7. Heterogeneous Treatment Effect across Regions  
Variables OLS DID 
PSM-DID 
Base I Strategy I Base II Strategy II 
PMC*Post 
reform 
 
311.045*** 
(53.675) 
304.980*** 
(81.584) 
206.801*** 
(73.710) 
240.821*** 
(66.889) 
235.398*** 
(67.369) 
PMC dummy 
-27.407 
(79.745) 
-181.348** 
(73.671) 
-90.543 
(139.860) 
11.735 
(104.249) 
-150.737 
(116.648) 
47.918 
(83.611) 
Power exp.  
56.898* 
(29.974) 
51.254* 
(30.192) 
160.156* 
(92.018) 
119.761* 
(68.810) 
179.416* 
(68.626) 
83.988 
(61.666) 
Eastern 
173.448*** 
(42.361) 
175.827*** 
(42.259) 
226.302* 
(126.599) 
208.161* 
(102.979) 
389.709*** 
(122.803) 
488.102*** 
(97.340) 
Central 
-144.869*** 
(47.804) 
-140.646*** 
(47.904) 
-63.678 
(133.638) 
-31.652 
(108.725) 
36.210 
(104.438) 
30.461 
(78.691) 
Treated*Eastern 
737.310*** 
(134.011) 
729.479*** 
(134.408) 
343.989* 
(205.838) 
350.670* 
(184.518) 
579.984*** 
(203.572) 
362.010** 
(174.809) 
Treated*Central 
290.302*** 
(100.072) 
287.099*** 
(100.291) 
458.907** 
(210.529) 
154.170 
(161.510) 
449.761*** 
(155.638) 
24.902 
(114.263) 
Fiscal effort  
370.472*** 
(74.325) 
377.576 
(71.940) 
 
588.269** 
(257.297) 
 
549.814*** 
(102.565) 
Per capita        
   Gen. transfer  
0.448* 
(0.248) 
0.472* 
(0.257) 
 
0.476* 
(0.285) 
 
0.549 
(0.388) 
   Sp. transfer 
0.992*** 
(0.121) 
0.992*** 
(0.121) 
 
1.449*** 
(0.243) 
 
1.046*** 
(0.171) 
Per pupil  
   Financial         
   subsidy 
-0.241* 
(0.123) 
-0.252*** 
(0.124) 
 
-1.213** 
(0.597) 
 
-0.248 
(0.153) 
Elementary     
   enrolment 
-6.958*** 
(0.648) 
-6.911* 
(0.646) 
 
-9.170*** 
(1.528) 
 
-9.960*** 
(1.165) 
Pupils(/HH) 
-1288.297*** 
(153.813) 
-1295.682*** 
(153.788) 
 
-1963.053*** 
(348.939) 
 
-2014.925*** 
(305.981) 
Pop. density 
-719.378 
(459.211) 
-761.099 
(466.611) 
 
-1125.792 
(793.470) 
 
-527.324 
(729.135) 
% of        
   Fiscal     
   dependents 
-7219.921*** 
(2038.721) 
-7375.012*** 
(2085.055) 
 
-8331.86** 
(4171.751) 
 
-8115.314** 
(3607.880) 
   Rural  
   enrolment 
-540.328*** 
(141.345) 
-535.320*** 
(140.880) 
 
-164.925 
(172.639) 
 
-310.452 
(269.983) 
Intercept 2115.417 2139.974 1153.06 1934.986 1157.492 2031.163 
Post reform 
dummy 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistics 172.52 167.94 84.05 53.87 131.76 93.03 
R2 0.549 0.554 0.355 0.602 0.320 0.558 
Obs. N 2,583 2,583 524 524 1,020 1,018 
Notes: Dependent variable is per pupil educational spending in each county. Strategy I: Logistic regression matching 
using Mahalanobis distance. Strategy II: Logistic regression matching using nearest neighbour with caliper. Power 
exp. = Power Expansion Reform. Gen.= General transfer. Sp.= Special transfer. Pupils(/HH) = Pupils per 
Household. Pop. = Population. Cluster-robust standard errors are in the parenthesis. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 
0.01. 
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Table 8. PMC Effect with Power Expansion Reform in Extended (2003-2009) and Two-
period (2005-2007) Sample 
Variables  
Extended Sample Two-period Sample 
OLS DID OLS DID 
PMC reform 
516.254*** 
(68.940) 
327.434*** 
(68.796) 
508.997*** 
(61.173) 
284.565*** 
(49.998) 
Power expansion reform  
31.038 
(42.460) 
85.217** 
(41.592) 
-24.146 
(39.039) 
-28.464 
(39.400) 
Region (Western=0)      
     Eastern 
-30.487 
(59.011) 
-41.329 
(59.341) 
107.895* 
(56.330) 
108.845* 
(56.365) 
     Central 
-344. 650*** 
(59.583) 
-350.658*** 
(59.888) 
-166.864*** 
(56.184) 
-165.091***  
(56.312) 
Intercept  1007.537 1182.946 1208.546 1237.073 
Time dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistics 600.78 712.28 434.81 377.55 
R2 0.424 0.354 0.256 0.260 
Observations 5,182 5,182 2,592 2,592 
Notes: Dependent variable is the per pupil educational spending in elementary schools in the county level. Cluster-
robust standard errors are in the parenthesis. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.    
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APPENDIX  
Figure A.1a: Common Support Plot, Strategy I  
 
 
Figure A.1b Common Support Plot, Strategy II  
 
Notes. X axis is the estimated propensity score with Strategy I. Data source is the sub-sample data in 2005.  
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Table A.1 Logit Estimates for the Probability of Participating in the PMC reform  
Variable PMC reform participants Over non-PMC participants 
Per capita   
    GDP (log)  9.577**(4.335) 
    GPD quadratic term -0.349*(0.210) 
    Fiscal revenue  -0.002**(0.001) 
    General transfer  0.011*(0.007) 
% of   
    Rural population  59.644***(22.558) 
    Rural population quadratic term -20.489***(6.747) 
    Labor force in Primary Sector 15.597**(7.879) 
Eastern  7.125(6.125) 
Central  26.818***(4.545) 
Intercept  -74.152 
R2  0.309 
Observations  1,296 
Notes. Interactions of any two of the pre-matching variables were included in the logit model. The sample was 
limited to the 2005 pre-matching data. Values in the parenthesis are robust standard errors. *p < 0.1. ** p < 0.05. *** p 
< 0.01.  
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Highlights (3-5 bullet points, max 85 characters each) 
 Causal effect of fiscal decentralization reform on elementary education expenditure 
 Combine matching and difference-in-difference to allow for self-sorting into reform 
 Positive effect on educational spending but little or negative effect on disparity 
 Allow for the concurrent County Strengthening and Power Expansion reform  
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
